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This paper presents a stock-flow consistent model+ of full-reserve banking. It is found that in a 
steady state, full-reserve banking can accommodate a zero-growth economy and provide both full 
employment and zero inflation. Furthermore, a money creation experiment is conducted with the 
model. An increase in central bank reserves translates into a two-thirds increase in demand deposits. 
Money creation through government spending leads to a temporary increase in real GDP and 
inflation. Surprisingly, it also leads to a permanent reduction in consolidated government debt. The 
claims that full-reserve banking would precipitate a credit crunch or excessively volatile interest 
rates are found to be baseless. 
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+ The model REFORM is available for download. The baseline scenario (the “old” steady state) is available at: 
www.patriziolaina.com/tiedostot/frb_steady_state.txt. The money creation experiment (the transition phase leading to the “new” 
steady state) is available at: www.patriziolaina.com/tiedostot/frb_money_created.txt. In order to run the programs a licensed version 






Under full-reserve banking (FRB) private money creation is prohibited. Today it would mean that 
banks could no longer create new money in the form of bank deposits in the process of bank 
lending. FRB aims at separating the payments system from the financing system as well as 
monetary policy from credit policy. 
 
After the global financial crisis, FRB became a topical issue as a potential solution to financial 
instability. It has been proposed, for instance, by a report commissioned by the prime minister of 
Iceland (Sigurjonsson 2015), an established columnist at the Financial Times (Martin Wolf 2014a; 
2014b), and Positive Money (Jackson and Dyson 2012); however, many economists and 
commentators judge FRB (either positively or negatively) based on their prejudice rather than 
coherent analysis. 
 
The specific contribution of this paper is to build a stock-flow consistent (SFC) model of FRB. FRB 
has not been previously modeled in a SFC framework popularized by Godley and Lavoie (2012). 
Previously, it has only been modeled in a dynamic-stochastic general equilibrium framework of 
neoclassical economics (Benes and Kumhof 2012, 2013), in a system dynamics framework 
(Yamaguchi 2010, 2011, 2014), and in a dynamic multiplier framework (Flaschel et al. 2010; 
Chiarella et al. 2011). The last of these three comes closest to SFC modeling being based on stocks 
and flows, but not in the same sense as in Godley and Lavoie (2012). 
 
The SFC model of FRB built in this paper is called REFORM. It is developed from Godley and 
Lavoie’s (2012) model INSOUT. The key features of REFORM are: 
 
 Banks are required to hold central bank reserves in an amount equal to their demand 
deposits (full-reserve requirement). 
 The central bank sets the amount of reserves by buying government bills. 
 Households are the residual buyer of bills and, therefore, the bill rate is endogenous. 
 Banks adjust the interest rate on time deposits to attract enough deposits to fund loans. 
 
It is found that in a steady state FRB can accommodate a zero growth economy. In addition, both 
full employment and zero inflation are achieved.  
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Furthermore, this paper conducts an experiment with REFORM, in which money is created in a 
FRB system, and studies its consequences. An increase in central bank reserves translates into a 
two-thirds increase in demand deposits. Money creation through government spending leads to a 
temporary increase in real GDP and inflation. Surprisingly, it also leads to a permanent reduction in 
consolidated government debt. The claims that FRB would lead to a shortage of credit or 
excessively volatile interest rates are found to be baseless. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the balance-sheet, revaluation, and 
transaction-flow matrices. Section 3 presents and explains the equations. Section 4 discusses the 
properties of the “old” steady state. Section 5 conducts a money creation experiment and studies the 




This section presents the matrices of the model REFORM. The first subsection presents the 
balance-sheet matrix. The second subsection presents the revaluation matrix. Finally, the third 
subsection presents the transaction-flow matrix. 
	
2.1    Balance Sheets 
This subsection presents the balance-sheet matrix for the model REFORM. The table below depicts 
all real and financial assets and liabilities each sector can hold. Naturally, all columns and rows sum 
to zero except for real assets (inventories). 
 
Table 1. Balance-sheet matrix 
	
Households Firms Government Central bank Banks Sum
Inventories +IN +IN
Reserves −H +H 0
Demand deposits +M1 −M1 0
Time deposits +M2 −M2 0
Bills +Bh −B +Bcb 0
Bonds +BL∙pbL −BL∙pBL 0
Loans −L +L 0
Balance −V 0 +GD 0 0 −IN




The balance-sheet matrix of REFORM is very similar to the balance-sheet matrix of INSOUT in 
Godley and Lavoie (2012). Households hold demand deposits, time deposits, government bills, and 
government bonds. Firms finance their inventories (working capital) with bank loans. Fixed capital 
is omitted. The government finances its budget deficit by issuing bills and bonds. The central bank 
buys government bills in order to issue reserves. Banks hold reserves and loans as assets and 
demand and time deposits as liabilities.  
 
The only differences between REFORM and Godley and Lavoie’s (2012) INSOUT model are that 
households do not hold cash, banks do not hold bills, and banks do not have access to central bank 
advances.  
	
2.2     Revaluations 
This subsection describes the revaluation matrix for the model REFORM. The table below shows 
the revaluation matrix. 
 
As in Godley and Lavoie’s (2012) model INSOUT, government bonds are the only asset of which 
value can change between periods. Bonds are long-term securities here defined as perpetuities (also 
called “consols”) because they are never redeemed. It is assumed that each perpetuity pays the 
owner one unit of currency (e.g., dollar) after one period has elapsed. The one unit of currency is 
the coupon of the perpetuity.  
 
 




Bills are assumed to be short-term securities that mature within each period; therefore, their value 




Households Firms Government Central bank Banks Sum




2.3     Transaction Flows 
This subsection presents the transaction-flow matrix for the model REFORM. The table below 
presents the transaction-flow matrix, which captures all transactions and flows between sectors and 
between periods. Thus, what happens within a sector or within a period is not depicted. As usual, all 
the rows and columns of the transaction-flow matrix sum to zero. 
 
Table 3. Transaction-flow matrix 
	
 
The upper part of the transaction-flow matrix is the national income part. The key features are that 
only sales are taxed (no income tax) and all profits are always distributed (no retained earnings). 
GDP is added only as a memo item for clarification. As can be read form the table, interest 
payments on time deposits, government bills, and government bonds are not part of GDP, but 
interest payments on loans are.  
 
The lower part of the transaction-flow matrix is the flow-of-funds part which records changes in 
financial assets. The changes must exactly match the national income part. For example, if 
households have more inflows than outflows in the national income part, they are saving. In the 
Households Government Sum
Current Capital Current Capital Current Capital
Consumption −C +C 0
Government expenditures +G −G 0
Change in inventories +∆IN −∆IN 0
[Memo: GDP] [Y] [Y]
Sales tax −T +T 0
Wages +WB −WB 0
Entrepreneurial profits +Ff −Ff 0
Bank profits +Fb −Fb 0
Central bank profits +Fcb −Fcb 0
Interest on loans −rl‐1∙L‐1 +rl‐1∙L‐1 0
     …time deposits +rm‐1∙M2‐1 −rm‐1∙M2‐1 0
     ...bills +rb‐1∙Bh‐1 −rb‐1∙B‐1 +rb‐1∙Bcb‐1 0
     ...bonds +BL‐1 −BL‐1 0
Change in the stock of loans +∆L −∆L 0
     ...reserves +∆H −∆Hb 0
     …demand deposits −∆M1 +∆M1 0
     …time deposits −∆M2 +∆M2 0
     ...bills −∆Bh +∆B −∆Bcb 0
     ...bonds −∆BL∙pbL +∆BL∙pbL 0





flow-of-funds part this means that they are accumulating at least one type of asset (which is 
recorded with a minus sign in order to balance the column). 
 
The national income part of the transaction-flow matrix (the upper part) is exactly the same as in 
Godley and Lavoie’s (2012) model INSOUT. The only differences in REFORM are that there are 
no changes in the stocks of advances, bills held by banks, or cash held by households (as banks do 
not hold advances or bills and households do not hold cash) and, thus, there are, of course, no 




This section presents all the equations of the model REFORM. In total there are 76 equations of 
which 72 enter the model. The notation of equations follows that of Godley and Lavoie (2012). 
Thus, for readers of Monetary Economics this section should be quite easy to follow. 
 
Capital letters denote nominal values while lower-case letters denote real (inflation accounted) 
values. Greek letters are parameters.  
 
Subscript –1 refers to the end of previous period value (starting value for the current period). 
Subscripts s and d refer to supply and demand, respectively, in a broad sense. Subscripts f, h, g, cb, 
and b refer to different sectors: firms, households, government, central bank, and banks, 
respectively. Variables without subscript refer to realized values. 
 
Superscript e refers to short-term expected or target value while superscript T refers to long-term 
target value. Short-term and long-term target values differ as short-term targets typically follow a 
partial adjustment process. That is, economic agents do not try to immediately (within one period) 
reach their long-term targets, but instead slowly adjust their short-term targets towards their long-
term targets.  
 
Suffix A in the numbering of equations denotes that the equation is dropped from the model either 
because it is redundant or it is there only for clarification. All endogenous variables are allowed to 





3.1     Firms 
Decisions: 
	 	 	 	 (F.1)	
	 	 	 	 	 (F.2)	
∙ 	 	 	 	 	 (F.3)	
	 	 	 	 	 (F.4)	
∙ 1 ∙ 	 	 	 	 (F.5)	
∙ 	 	 	 	 	 (F.6)	
∙ 	 	 	 	 (F.7)	
∙ 	 	 	 (F.8)	
1 ∙ 1 ∙ 	 	 	 (F.9)	
1 ∙ ∙ 1 ∙ 	 	 (F.10)	
∙ ∙ ∙ 	 	 	 	 (F.11A)	
 
Real output is determined by expected sales and the expected change in inventories (F.1). This 
yields precisely the same result as using realized values as when sales differ from expected, 
inventories differ exactly by the same amount in different direction. Employment is determined by 
real output divided by productivity (F.2). The total wage bill is employment times nominal wage 
(F.3), while unit costs are the wage bill divided by real output (F.4). Expected sales depend on 
previous realized sales and what was expected in the previous period (F.5). The long-term target for 
inventories is a fraction of expected sales (F.6), where the fraction depends on an autonomous term 
and negatively on the interest rate on loans (F.7). The short-term target for inventories follows a 
partial adjustment process, where the inventories are steered gradually towards their long-term 
target (F.8). The price level of the economy depends on a mark-up set over normal historical unit 
costs and sales tax rate (F.9). Normal historic unit costs depend on current and previous unit costs, 
including financing costs (F.10). Expected entrepreneurial profits can be written in terms of 
nominal expected sales, the sales tax rate, and the mark-up (F.11A), but this equation does not 









∙ ∙ 	 	 	 (F.12)	
∙ 1 ∙ 	 	 	 (F.13)	
 
Inflationary forces are introduced into the model through wages. Workers target a real wage which 
is positively related to productivity and employment (F.12). Workers partially adjust their nominal 
wage according to the discrepancy between the targeted and realized real wage in the previous 
period (F.13).  
 
Realized outcomes: 
	 	 	 	 	 (F.14)	
∙ 	 	 	 	 	 (F.15)	
	 	 	 	 (F.16)	
	 	 	 	 	 (F.17)	
∙ 	 	 	 	 	 (F.18)	
	 	 	 	 	 (F.19)	
∆ ∙ 	 	 	 (F.20)	
	 	 	 	 	 (F.21)	
∙ ∙ ∆ 	 	 	 	 (F.22)	
 
Real sales are the sum of real consumption and government expenditures (F.14), while nominal 
sales are simply real sales multiplied by the price level (F.15). Real inventories are inventories 
inherited from the previous period plus the discrepancy between real output and sales (what is 
produced but not sold must add to the inventory stock) (F.16). Realized fraction of inventories to 
sales is the end-of-period inventories divided by sales (F.17). As is customary, the nominal value of 
inventories is real inventories multiplied by unit costs, that is, inventories are valued at their 
production cost and not, for instance, at their expected sale price (F.18). Firms demand loans to 
finance their inventories (F.19). Realized entrepreneurial profits are nominal sales and the change in 
the nominal value of inventories minus taxes, wages, and interest payments on loans (F.20). 
Inflation is defined, as usual, as the relative change in the price level (F.21). Finally, nominal output 





3.2     Households 
Realized outcomes: 
∙ 2 ∙ 	 	 (H.1)	
∆ ∙ 	 	 	 	 (H.2)	
	 	 	 	 (H.3)	
	 	 	 	 	 (H.4)	
	 	 	 	 (H.5)	
1 2 ∙ 	 	 	 (H.6A)	
∙ 	 	 	 	 (H.7)	
	 	 	 	 (H.8)	
∆ 	 	 	 	 (H.9A)	
	 	 	 	 	 (H.10)	
 
Unlike with firms, I describe the equations for households starting from realized outcomes and only 
then proceeding to decisions. Regular disposable income includes wages, profits, and interest 
revenue on time deposits, bills, and bonds (H.1). Capital gains are the change in the price of bonds 
multiplied by the end-of-period amount of bonds (H.2). Haig-Simons nominal disposable income 
includes regular disposable income and capital gains (H.3). Total profits distributed to households 
consist of entrepreneurial profits and banks’ profits (H.4). Notice that profits are always distributed 
in full and, therefore, there are no retained earnings.  
 
Wealth of households is the wealth inherited from the previous period plus Haig-Simons disposable 
income minus consumption (H.5). Wealth of households could also be written as the sum of all 
financial assets (H.6A), but as will be later seen this equation is saved for another purpose. Real 
regular disposable income is nominal regular disposable income minus the inflation tax on real 
wealth (H.7). Similarly as before, Haig-Simons real disposable income is real regular disposable 
income plus real capital gains (H.8), which is the same as real consumption plus the change in real 









∙ ∙ 	 	 	 (H.11)	
∙ 1 ∙ 	 	 	 (H.12)	
∙ 	 	 	 	 	 (H.13)	
∙ ∙ 	 	 	 	 (H.14)	
	 	 	 	 (H.15)	
 
Households make a two-stage decision following Keynes (1936, 166). First, they decide how much 
they will save (by deciding how much they spend). Second, they decide how to allocate their wealth 
(portfolio equations below). Real consumption of households depends on expected real regular 
disposable income, real wealth of previous period, and an autonomous term (H.11). In turn, 
expected real regular disposable income depends on previous real regular disposable income and 
what was previously expected (H.12). Nominal consumption is real consumption times the price 
level (H.13). However, expected nominal regular disposable income depends on expected real 
regular disposable income times the price level but also on inflation revenue on real wealth (H.14). 
Putting things together, nominal expected wealth depends on previous wealth plus expected saving 
(expected nominal regular disposable income minus consumption) (H.15). 
 
Demand for assets (portfolio equations): 1 
∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ 	 	 (H.16)	
∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ 	 	 (H.17)	
∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ 	 	 (H.18)	
∙
∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ 	 	 (H.19)	
 
Now, we arrive to the second stage of Keynes’s (1936, 166) decision-making process in which 
households decide how they allocate their wealth. Demand for various assets is depicted in the	
portfolio equations above following Tobinesque principles. Adding-up constraints, emphasized by 
Tobin (1969), are satisfied. 2 
 
																																																													
1 The rates of return on demand deposits and  associated to them are dropped from portfolio equations as the rate of 
return on demand deposits is assumed to be zero. 
2 Vertical conditions are: ∑ 1, ∑ 0, ∑ 0, ∑ 0, and ∑ 0. Symmetry conditions (which 
together with vertical conditions also satisfy horizontal conditions) are: , 	 	 .  
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The fraction of demand deposits to expected total wealth depends positively (the coefficient is 
positive) on an autonomous and a transaction term (first and last term on the right-hand side) and 
negatively on rates of return on other assets (H.16). Although cash is not explicitly included, it can 
be thought to be implicitly included in demand deposits as under FRB they are analytically exactly 
the same: they are used for transactions, they do not earn interest, they cannot fund bank lending, 
and they provide a completely safe store of value.  
 
In turn, the fraction of time deposits depends positively on an autonomous term and its own rate of 
return (first two terms on the right-hand side) and negatively on rates of return on other assets and 
transactions (H.17). Similarly to time deposits, the fraction of bills depends positively on an 
autonomous term and its own rate of return and negatively on rates of return on other assets and 
transactions (H.18). As with time deposits and bills, the fraction of bonds also depends positively 
on an autonomous term and its own rate of return and negatively on rates of return on other assets 
and transactions (H.19).  
 
Realized asset holdings: 
1 2 	 	 	 	 (H.20)	
2 2 	 	 	 	 	 (H.21)	
	 	 	 	 	 (H.22)	
1 2 ∙ 	 	 	 (H.23)	
	 	 	 	 (H.24A)	
∙ ∙ ∙
	 	 	 (H.25)	
 
Although portfolio equations determine the demand for assets, the realized holdings of assets 
typically differ as realized wealth and income usually differ from what was expected. As in Godley 
and Lavoie (2012), demand deposits act as a “buffer” which reconciles the discrepancy between 
expected and realized outcomes.  
 
The realized holding of demand deposits is determined by central bank reserves minus the 
difference between time deposits and loans (H.20). This can also be read from banks’ balance sheet. 
The idea behind this is that demand deposits are initially equal to reserves. However, households 
can invest in time deposits offered by banks, which reduces demand deposits held by households. 
Banks’ can now use these funds to make loans. As banks make loans, demand deposits are returned 
12 
	
into circulation (thus, bank lending does not create money under FRB). If banks do not make loans 
as much as households make time deposits, demand deposits do not get returned into circulation 
and, therefore, their amount is less than reserves.  
 
Also Keynes (1936, 110–11) pointed out that the demand for money (liquidity preference) is 
irrelevant in the sense that it cannot directly affect the amount of money: 
 
“The concept of hoarding may be regarded as a first approximation to the concept 
of liquidity-preference. […] For the amount of hoarding must be equal to the 
quantity of money […]. All that the propensity of the public towards hoarding can 
achieve is to determine the rate of interest [and rates of return on financial assets 
more generally] at which the aggregate desire to hoard becomes equal to the 
available cash.” (Italics in original) 
 
Time deposits and bonds are determined more straightforwardly. The realized holdings of time 
deposits and bonds equal their demand (H.21 and H.22). 
 
The realized amount of bills held by households is total wealth minus other financial assets (H.23). 
This equation is simply (H.6A) rearranged. However, the amount of bills left for households is 
entirely determined by the decisions of the government (how many bills it issues) and the central 
bank (how many bills it buys to monetize government debt) (H.24A). In other words, households 
are the residual buyer of bills. Nevertheless, households cannot be forced to hold bills against their 
will.  
 
In order to ensure that households buy exactly all the remaining bills, the interest rate on bills must 
be endogenous. Thus, the interest rate on bills is determined by the portfolio equation solved for the 
bill rate instead of the amount of bills (H.25). In the model the bill rate3 corresponds to the main 
policy rate today (e.g., the federal funds rate in the US, the base rate in the UK, and the rate of main 
refinancing operations in the euroarea). 
 
The redundant equation is the equation indicating that households are the residual buyer of bills 
(H.24A). Although equation (H.24A) does not explicitly enter the model, it gives exactly the same 
result as (H.23). The equation is dropped from the model as otherwise the model would be 
overdetermined. This means that all the other equations together already imply the dropped 
equation.  
																																																													
3 Notice that, for simplification, the main rate is the bill rate rather than more realistically the inter-bank overnight rate.  
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3.3     Government  
Fiscal policy: 
∙ ∙ 	 	 	 	 (G.1)	
∙ 	 	 	 	 	 (G.2)	
∙ 	 	 (G.3)	
∆ ∙ 	 	 	 (G.4)	
	 	 	 	 	 (G.5)	
̅ 	 	 	 	 	 (G.6)	
	 	 	 	 	 (G.7)	
∙ 	 	 	 	 (G.8)	
∙ 	 	 	 	 (G.9)	
 
The government collects taxes according to the sales tax rate it sets exogenously (G.1). Nominal 
government expenditures are simply real government expenditures, which are set exogenously, 
multiplied by the price level (G.2). 
 
The government budget deficit, that is, the public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR) is the 
difference between total outlays (including spending and interest payments on bills and bonds) and 
total income (including taxes and central bank profits) (G.3). The government issues (redeems) bills 
to finance the part of the budget deficit (surplus) that is not financed by the issuance of government 
bonds (G.4). The government lets households decide how many bonds they want to hold (G.5) with 
the interest rate set exogenously by the government (G.6). Alternatively, as with bills, the 
government could decide how many bonds it wants to issue and let the bond rate to be determined 
on the market. The price of bonds is simply the coupon (one unit of currency) divided by the bond 
rate (G.7).  
 
Gross government debt4 is simply the value of outstanding bills and bonds (G.8). Consolidated 
government debt is the value of bills and bonds held by non-public entities (G.9). Put differently, 
consolidated government debt is gross government debt minus intra-government debt (in this case 
bills held by the central bank). Consolidated government debt is also known as excessive deficit 
																																																													
4 The market value of government debt can differ from its recorded historical value, which is generally reported by 
officials, to the extent that bond prices have appreciated or depreciated. However, as the bond rate is set exogenously, 
there cannot be any changes in bond prices and, thus, in this instance the market value of government debt also equals 
its recorded historical value. 
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procedure (EDP) government debt as it is used for calculating the Maastricht criteria in the EU. 
This means that it is the “official” figure for government debt in the EU.  
 
3.4     Central Bank 
Monetary policy: 
	 	 	 	 	 (C.1)	
	 	 	 	 	 (C.2)	
0	 	 	 	 	 (C.3)	
∙ 	 	 	 	 (C.4)	
 
The central bank can greatly influence the money supply through reserves. As can be directly read 
from the balance-sheet matrix, the central bank sets the amount of reserves by determining how 
many bills it holds (C.1). The simplest monetary policy rule is to keep the amount of bills constant, 
that is, the amount of bills is exogenous (C.2). Alternative monetary policy rules are worth 
considering but they are not the topic of this paper. 
 
As it is assumed that interest is not paid on reserves (C.3), the profit of the central bank is 
determined by the interest payments it receives on bills from the government (C.4).  
 
3.5     Banks 
Liquidity: 
∙ 1 ∙ 2 		 	 	 (B.1)	
	 	 	 	 	 (B.2)	
	 	 	 	 	 (B.3)	
 
The full-reserve requirement is incorporated by setting the reserve requirement for demand deposits 
 equal to 1 (B.1). There is no reserve requirement for time deposits so  is equal to zero. Banks 
demand whatever reserves they are supplied with (B.2). The bank liquidity ratio is the ratio between 







Monetary and credit aggregates: 
1 1 	 	 	 	 	 (B.4)	
2 2 	 	 	 	 	 (B.5)	
	 	 	 	 	 (B.6)	
 
Banks supply both demand and time deposits in whatever amount is required (B.4 and B.5). As 
previously described, the amount of demand deposits can be read from banks’ balance sheets 
(H.20). The amount of time deposits is completely determined by their demand (H.16 and H.21). 
Banks also accommodate the demand for loans for all creditworthy firms (B.6).  
 
Determination of interest rates: 
∆ 	 	 	 	 (B.7)	
∆ ∙ 	 	 	 	 (B.8)	
1, 	 	 	 	 (B.9)	
1, 	 	 	 	 (B.10)	
∆ ∆ 	 	 	 	 (B.11)	
∆ ∙ 	 	 	 	 (B.12)	
1, 	 		 	 	 (B.13)	
1, 	 		 	 	 (B.14)	
	 	 	 (B.15)	
∙ ∙ 2 	 	 	 (B.16)	
 
Banks can set the interest rates on time deposits and loans, while the interest rate on demand 
deposits is assumed to be zero (which is also very much in line with the real world today). Banks 
follow a partial adjustment process when setting the interest rate on time deposits (B.7 and B.8). If 
the bank liquidity ratio falls below its desired level in the previous period, banks increase the 
deposit rate to attract more time deposits (B.9). As households invest in time deposits, their demand 
deposits get reduced and this increases the bank liquidity ratio. Symmetrically, when the bank 
liquidity ratio increases above its desired level in the previous period, banks decrease the deposit 
rate to reduce the amount of time deposits (B.10). As long as the bank liquidity ratio stays within its 
desired range, banks do not alter the interest rate on time deposits.  
 
Banks set the interest rate they charge on loans to ensure a sufficient profit margin. When setting 
the loan rate, banks follow a partial adjustment process as well as the bill rate (B.11 and B.12). 
16 
	
Now, when the bank profit margin is below its desired level, banks increase the interest rate they 
charge on loans (B.13). Symmetrically, when the bank profit margin is above its desired level, 
banks decrease the interest rate on loans (B.14). Unlike in mainstream economics, banks do not 
maximize profits (at least in the short run). Godley and Lavoie (2012, 340) justify this by the banks’ 
fear of government regulation or consumer outrage. The bank profit margin is determined by 
average profits divided by the sum of average demand and time deposits (B.15). Finally, banks’ 
profits are determined by the difference between the interest payments they receive from loans and 
the interest payments they make on time deposits (B.16). In this model real rates are meaningless 
but they could be used instead of nominal rates. 5 
 
4. STEADY STATE 
 
In the simplest SFC models it is possible to obtain a determinate analytical solution for a steady 
state. However, in more complex models, such as REFORM, obtaining a determinate steady-state 
solution analytically becomes impossible as the model is path-dependent. It can be said that the 
model exhibits deep endogeneity as the steady state depends on the past history. The steady-state 
solution for each set of parameters and initial values can, however, be obtained through simulation.  
 
The steady state of REFORM is stationary as there is no productivity growth or other forces driving 
economic growth. That is, there is no push for economic growth or collapse under FRB and, 
therefore, it is a zero-growth economy.  
 
In an FRB system with no economic growth both full employment and zero inflation are achieved. 
In other words, FRB does not in itself lead to a fall in employment. In addition, it does not cause 
inflationary—let alone hyperinflationary—nor deflationary tendencies. 
 
In the steady state there is no increase in either public nor private debt. Servicing debt is also 
entirely possible. Thus, under FRB there is no push for ever increasing (nominal) debt. 6  
 
																																																													
5 Real rates can be defined as 1, 1, 1, 1 and 
1. 
6 Hoarding by firms or banks (in the sense of retained earnings) is, however, not allowed in the model. If this 
assumption were relaxed, the conclusion might be different. 
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There is no shortage of credit under FRB either. Banks are able to supply all loans that are 
demanded by creditworthy borrowers. If needed, banks adjust the interest rate on time deposits to 
attract enough deposits to fund the loans. 
 
In the steady state time deposits exceed demand deposits. Although under FRB this might first 
sound a bit weird, it is completely possible as the same money (demand deposits) can be re-lent. For 
instance, if households acquire time deposits, their demand deposits are reduced by the same 
amount. However, banks can lend these demand deposits for firms. Again, firms can pay wages for 
households with these demand deposits. Thus, the same demand deposits households used for 
acquiring time deposits can be returned back to them through firms and used again to acquire more 
time deposits or other assets. 
 
The existence of a steady state in an FRB system is already an argument for FRB as it implies that 
the state of issues can be attained indefinitely. However, it is possible that the system becomes 
unstable as soon as something changes. Next, in order to address this issue let us conduct a money 
creation experiment with the model REFORM. 
 
5. MONEY CREATION EXPERIMENT 
 
Under FRB money is created through government spending, as has been proposed by Jackson and 
Dyson (2012) and Sigurjonsson (2015), among others. In the experiment with REFORM the central 
bank buys bills worth 15, which increases reserves from 50 to 65, and the government increases its 
spending by 15 for one period and then spending returns to its previous value. 
 
The money creation experiment takes place in period 15. In the figures below an area from period 
15 to 34 is shaded to depict the transition phase from the “old” steady state to the “new” steady 
state. For clarification, the following subsections use notation t=0 for indicating period 15, that is, 
exactly when money creation takes place, t=1 for the following period, etc. 
 
When interpreting the figures it is important to take the scale into account as the figures are scaled 
appropriately to depict the movements of variables. Therefore, depending on the scale, a radical-




5.1     GDP and Inflation 
As can be seen from Figure 1, below, both real GDP and inflation speed up temporarily after money 
is created. The level of real GDP peaks at a 7% higher level and then returns to its new steady state 
value which is exactly the same as the “old” steady state. The period-on-period inflation rate peaks 
at 0.5% before returning to zero in the new steady state.  In the peak the price level is 3% higher, 
but as inflation is very slightly negative for multiple periods after the transition phase, the price 
level also ultimately converges to its “old” steady-state value.  
 
 




5.2     Monetary and Credit Aggregates 
As equation (H.20) showed, the amount of demand deposits held by households depends on 
reserves and the discrepancy between time deposits and loans. In the experiment reserves are 
increased from 50 to 65. Should time deposits and loans stay constant or move by the same amount 
in the same direction, changes in demand deposits would exactly match changes in reserves. 
However, as figure 2 (below) shows, this is not the case, as households will reallocate their wealth 
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In period 15 (t=0), exactly when reserves are increased by 15, demand deposits increase by only 3. 
The reason for this is that the gap between time deposits and loans widens by 13: time deposits 
increase by 2 and loans fall by 11 (the numbers do not exactly add up because of rounding). The 
main reason why the gap widens is that firms demand fewer loans as they have fewer inventories 
that need to be financed. Inventories drop sharply as sales easily exceed expected sales. Particularly 
for this reason, an increase in reserves does not instantly translate into an equal increase in demand 
deposits. 
 
In period 16 (t=1) monetary policy seems to transmit more effectively as demand deposits increase 
by 11 (compared to the “old” steady-state total increase of 14, which is almost equal to the increase 
of reserves by 15). Demand deposits peak as loans have returned close to their “old” steady-state 
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deposits do not change, the gap between time deposits and loans shrinks by 11, which exactly 
matches the increase in demand deposits.  
 
In period 17 (t=2) households continue to rebalance their asset portfolios which leads to a sharp 
decline in demand deposits. As households increase their time deposits by 8 and the demand for 
loans decreases by 1, the drop in demand deposits is 9. In the following transition periods (t=3+) 
demand deposits recover as time deposits slightly decrease while loans increase. 
 
Finally in the “new” steady state, all variables level off (there are only very minor movements as 
variables continue to converge to their ultimate values). In the end, compared to the “old” steady 
state, demand deposits increased by 10, time deposits by 7, and loans by 2. To put it briefly, 
increasing reserves by 15 translated into an increase of 10 in demand deposits.  
 
5.3     Bank Liquidity and Deposit Rate 
The bank liquidity ratio was defined by equation (B.3) as reserves relative to demand deposits. 
Under FRB this ratio has to be at least 1 to satisfy the liquidity requirement. Otherwise, banks are in 
a liquidity crisis. 
 
Banks can indirectly influence their liquidity ratio by changing the interest rate they offer on time 
deposits. This may also partly help to explain the above-observed fluctuations in time deposits and, 
subsequently, in demand deposits. As can be seen from figure 3, below, banks target a liquidity  


















In period 15 (t=0) banks receive reserves worth 15 which increases their liquidity ratio over the 
preferred upper target of 1.2. In the next period (t=1) banks react to this by reducing the interest rate 
on time deposits to curb households’ demand for time deposits. Consequently, households end up 
with significantly more demand deposits (although, as was seen in figure 2, above, this is mainly 
because of loans recover). The increase in demand deposits again drops the bank liquidity ratio 
below its lower target.  
 
In period 17 (t=2) banks again react to this, but this time they increase the deposit rate back to its 
“old” steady-state value. As was also shown figure 2, above, households strongly react to this by 
increasing their holding of time deposits. This, together with no significant change in firms’ demand 
for loans, reduces demand deposits strongly. Now the bank liquidity ratio again exceeds its upper 
target.  
 
In periods 18–20 (t=3–5) banks react by reducing the deposit rate each period. In the following 
periods (t=6+) the system starts to find its new steady state as the liquidity ratio is within its target 
range and, consequently, banks do not alter the deposit rate anymore. Compared to the “old” steady 
state the interest rate on time deposits is 0.03% points lower.  
 
In the experiment the money supply is increased by 30% to study what happens when the targeted 
bank liquidity ratio is exceeded and when unusually large changes in the money supply take place. 
As was seen above, when the bank liquidity ratio target is exceeded, banks can adjust the interest 
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At any moment there is no shortage of credit. In the end, the interest rate on time deposits dropped 
by mere 0.03 % points even though the money supply was increased dramatically. As will be 
discovered next, in contrast to what some claim, unusually large changes in the money supply do 
not even lead to an excessively volatile interest rate on bills (the main rate in the model) under FRB. 
 
5.4     Bills and Main Rate 
As new money is created in the experiment, the central bank buys bills worth 15, the government 
increases its spending by 15 for one period, and then government spending returns to its previous 
value. Intuitively, the amount of bills held by households (thus also the bill rate) should stay 
constant as households are the residual buyer of bills. Surprisingly, however, Figure 4, below, 
shows that bills held by households decrease—and they keep on decreasing over multiple periods 
even after money has already been created.  
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The counterintuitive result can be explained as follows. As some of the government spending also 
increases tax revenue for the government, the government budget deficit is less than 15, that is, less 
than the increase in government spending. Thus, the government does not need to issue new bills 
worth 15 but only 12. This leads to the situation where households’ holding of bills is reduced by 3 
in period 15 (t=0) as the central bank buys 15 of them. As households are left with fewer bills, the 
interest rate on bills (the main rate) drops slightly to reconcile demand with supply.  
 
In periods 16 and 17 (t=1–2) households reallocate their wealth and increase their holdings of bonds 
of which the interest rate remains unchanged (not depicted in a figure). This further reduces the 
amount of bills households hold as government debt can be restructured by households; that is, an 
increase in bonds means an equal decrease in bills (given the amount of government debt), as can 
also be read from equation (G.4). The reallocation of household wealth also contributes to the 
decrease in the bill rate. 
 
From period 16 onwards (t=1+), the government runs a small but persistent budget surplus which 
also partly reduces bills and bonds held by households. This government surplus is the third force 
pushing the bill rate down. 
 
Finally, the economy finds the “new” steady state where households have reduced their holding of 
bills by 16 and the interest rate on bills has dropped from 0.5% to 0.28%. Although the money 
supply was increased quite dramatically by 30%, it did not lead to any noteworthy volatility in the 
bill rate—contrary to what is claimed by some economists. Instead, it leads to a smooth and 
relatively small change in the bill rate on its path to its “new” steady-state value. 
 
5.5     Private Wealth and Public Debt 
As post-Keynesians often emphasize, relying on an accounting identity, public sector debt increases 
private sector wealth. The net financial wealth of the whole private sector (comprising households, 
firms, and banks) is exactly equal to gross government debt.  
 
Figure 5, (below) shows the development of household wealth and government debt. Household 
wealth closely matches the development of gross government debt. The small discrepancy is 
explained by loans granted to firms (see figure 2). The net financial wealth of households (which is 
also gross, as there are no household liabilities in the model) is exactly equal to gross government 
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debt plus loans (inventories are real wealth and therefore the net financial wealth of firms is 
negative). 
 
Figure 5. Household wealth and government debt 
 
 
Although household wealth is only slightly higher in the “new” steady state, the composition of 
wealth has greatly changed. As was seen in previous subsections, demand deposits, time deposits 
and bonds contributed positively to the increase in household wealth. The decrease in bills held by 
households contributed negatively. 
 
As figure 4 showed, the government runs a brief but large budget deficit followed by a persistent 
but small budget surplus. Figure 5Figure 5, above, shows how this translates into gross and 
consolidated government debt relative to GDP. Not surprisingly, gross government debt first 
increases and then slowly reverts back. As previously pointed out, this also represents the 
development of the net financial wealth of the whole private sector.  
 
However, more noteworthy is the smooth and permanent reduction in consolidated government 
debt. It has at least three important implications. First, it reduces interest payments on government 
debt which can be used otherwise to service the public interest. Second, in the long run after more 
and more money was created the government could also become “debt-free,” if so decided, in the 
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Third, the reduction in consolidated government debt offers a practical way out of the eurocrisis. In 
the EU consolidated government debt (known as EDP debt) is used for calculating the Maastricht 
criteria. Therefore, new money creation by the European Central Bank (ECB) could offer a way to 
reduce government debt and offer much needed fiscal stimulus. The exact means of how new 
money would be distributed should be decided politically. For instance, new money could be 
distributed among euroarea member states in relation to their population. 
 
This section experimented with the REFORM model to study how new money creation under FRB 
would influence the economy. In the model, money creation took place through government 
spending. Jackson and Dyson (2012) and Sigurjonsson (2015) give four alternative ways to create 
money under FRB: reduce taxes; repay government debt; pay dividend for citizens; and lend it to 
banks on the condition that it will be on-lent to the real economy. These alternative ways to create 




This paper builds a simple, yet coherent and complete, SFC model of FRB called REFORM. In the 
steady state an FRB system accommodated a zero-growth economy, that is, there was no push for 
economic growth or collapse. Full employment and zero inflation were also achieved.  
 
In addition, a money creation experiment was conducted with the model REFORM. An increase in 
central bank reserves translated into a two-thirds increase in demand deposits. Money creation 
through government spending led to a temporary increase in real GDP and inflation. Surprisingly, it 
also led to a permanent reduction in consolidated government debt.  
 
The permanent reduction in consolidated government debt had at least three important implications. 
First, it could reduce interest payments on government debt which could be used otherwise. Second, 
eventually the government could become “debt-free” in the sense that it would not be indebted 
towards any private agent. Third, it could offer a practical way out of the eurocrisis. As in the EU 
consolidated government debt (known as EDP debt) is used for calculating the Maastricht criteria, 




The claims that FRB would lead to a credit crunch or excessively volatile interest rates were found 
to be baseless. At all times banks could grant all demanded loans to creditworthy borrowers by 
adjusting the interest rate on time deposits. An unusually large change in the money supply only led 
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APPENDIX: LIST OF VARIABLES 
Table 4. List of endogenous variables 
Symbol Description 
 Bills held by central bank 
 Demand for bills 
 Bills held by households 
 Supply of bills 
 Demand for bonds 
 Bonds held by households 
 Supply of bonds 
 Bank liquidity ratio 
 Bank profit margin 
 Real consumption 
 Nominal consumption 
 Capital gains 
 Total profits distributed to households 
 Profits of banks 
 Profits of central bank 
 Entrepreneurial profits 
 Expected entrepreneurial profits 
 Nominal government expenditures 
 Gross government debt 
 Consolidated government debt (EDP debt) 
 Demand for reserves 
 Required reserves from banks 
 Supply of reserves 
 Real inventories 
 Real short-term target inventories 
 Real long-term target inventories 
 Nominal inventories 
 Demand for loans 
 Supply of loans 
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1  Demand for demand deposits 
1  Demand deposits held by households 
1  Supply of demand deposits 
2  Demand for time deposits 
2  Time deposits held by households 
2  Supply of time deposits 
 Employment level 
 Normal historic unit costs 
 Price level 
 Price of bonds 
 Public sector borrowing requirement (government budget deficit) 
 Interest rate on bills 
 Interest rate on bonds 
 Interest rate on reserves 
 Interest rate on loans 
 Interest rate on time deposits 
 Real sales 
 Real expected sales 
 Nominal sales 
 Nominal sales taxes 
 Nominal unit costs 
 Real wealth of households 
 Nominal wealth of households 
 Expected nominal wealth of households 
 Nominal wage 
 Nominal wage bill 
 Real output 
 Nominal output 
 Real Haig-Simons disposable income 
 Real regular disposable income 
 Expected real regular disposable income 
 Nominal Haig-Simons disposable income 
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 Nominal regular disposable income 
 Expected nominal regular disposable income 
 Dichotomic variable related to bank liquidity ratio 
 Dichotomic variable related to bank liquidity ratio 
 Dichotomic variable related to bank profit margin 
 Dichotomic variable related to bank profit margin 
 Real inventories-to-sales ratio 
 Real long-term target inventories-to-sales ratio 
 Price inflation 
 Real wage 





Table 5. List of exogenous variables 
Symbol Description 
 Amount of bills central bank decides to hold  
 Bottom range of bank liquidity ratio 
 Top range of bank liquidity ratio 
 Bottom range of bank profit margin 
 Top range of bank profit margin 
 Real government expenditures 
 Full employment level 
 Productivity level 





Table 6. List of parameters 
Symbol Description 
 Autonomous consumption 
 Propensity to consume out of regular income 
 Propensity to consume out of past wealth 
 Reaction parameter related to sales expectations 
 Partial adjustment parameter related to target inventories 
 Reaction parameter related to income expectations 
 Reaction parameter related to changes in loan rate 
 Reaction parameter related to changes in deposit rate 
 Reaction parameters in portfolio equations 
 Compulsory reserve ratio on demand deposits  
 Compulsory reserve ratio on time deposits 
 Reaction parameter related to target inventories-to-sales ratio 
 Reaction parameter related to target inventories-to-sales ratio 
 Sales tax rate 
 Costing margin in pricing 
 Reaction parameter related to real wage targeting 
 Reaction parameter related to real wage targeting 
 Reaction parameter related to real wage targeting 
 Reaction parameter related to nominal wage setting 
 
 
